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AbstrAct. The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial 
regulatory mechanisms.  Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown.  Market 
discipline neglected to send any warning signals.  Internal control was seriously undermined 
by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere.  Does the crisis call the big three into question? 
No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation.  As 
such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only 
function together.  It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to 
the crisis.  By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution 
is to work on reinforcing each one.  Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go 
far enough.
JEL Classification: G01, G18, G21, G38
Key words: Prudential Supervision, Market Discipline, Internal Control, 
Financial Regulation.
résumé. La crise a révélé les failles de l’ensemble des mécanismes régulateurs de la 
finance mondiale : la réglementation prudentielle a échoué dans sa mission de prévention, 
la discipline de marché n’a pas envoyé les signaux d’alerte qu’on pouvait en attendre et le 
contrôle interne a été sérieusement écorné par des affaires retentissantes en France comme 
ailleurs. La crise remet-elle en question ce triptyque et condamne-t-elle à faire entièrement 
reposer la régulation financière sur la seule action des pouvoirs publics ? Si l’on part du 
principe qu’aucun mode de régulation n’est omniscient, pas plus l’État que le marché ou 
l’auto-contrôle, alors aucun des trois ne peut fonctionner à l’exclusion des deux autres. Défaire 
ce triptyque ne peut donc pas constituer une réponse à la crise.  Mais puisque chaque bras 
du triptyque a montré ses faiblesses, il convient de travailler au renforcement de chacun. À 
cet égard, il n’est toutefois pas garanti que les réformes aillent assez loin.
Classification JEL : G01, G18, G21, G38
Mots-clef : supervision prudentielle, discipline de marché, contrôle interne, 
régulation financière.
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The financial crisis, born in the summer of 2007 and still arguably alive in 2010, has 
revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms.  Prudential 
regulation failed to prevent the meltdown.  Market discipline neglected to send any warning 
signals – low risk premiums, high ratings.  Internal control was seriously undermined in France 
by doubtful dealings such as the Société Générale, Caisse d’épargne and Madoff affairs on 
a larger scale.  The big three are nevertheless the basis for today’s financial regulation and 
this situation is the result of a slow process of evolution.
The reforms that gave rise to “financial safety nets” in the 1930s in the United States – e.g. 
the 1933 Banking Act – then in post-war Europe and in Japan were all initially inspired 
by the desire to replace dysfunctional market regulation.  The resurgence of economic 
imbalances in the 1970s did, however, give financial operations a massive shot in the 
arm.  Three factors brought about new financial needs and prompted the creation of new 
financial products and new markets: first, the petrodollars from the oil-price shocks, recycling 
surpluses from oil-producing countries; second, the unstable interest rates subsequent to post 
oil-price shock inflation and the monetary change in course in the United States in 1979 with 
Paul Volker’s arrival as head of the Fed; and third, the fluctuating exchange rates related to 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973.  The boom in the capital market then 
automatically caused banking activity to evolve and the regulatory framework of the banking 
sector necessarily had to adapt accordingly.  The new regulation, termed “prudential” 
(minimum capital requirement), set up from the end of the 1980s, no longer attempted 
to substitute for the market mechanisms, but rather to limit risk taking by banks.  Market 
logic gradually found its place again in the banking sector, with the suppression of credit 
constraints, the liberalization of rates and the privatization of financial institutions among 
others, and held financial institutions to the relevant potential sanctions, such as investors’ 
demand for profitability, threats of buyouts, and the variability of resource costs.  Rising 
risks also made banks more sensitive to the need to manage risks and prompted bankers 
to adopt suitable evaluation and risk management tools.  Along the way, internal control 
was developed to the extent that major international banks endeavoured to get international 
authorities to recognize the use of these tools.  From the mid-1990s, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision recommended authorizing banks to use their internal “value at risk” 
models to calculate their capital needs.  As a result, the relationship between regulation, 
internal control and market discipline gradually grew stronger.
Does the crisis call the big three into question? Will it entail massive backtracking in regulation? 
In order to answer these questions, let us begin with a simple principle put forward by the 
2009 Nobel economics Prize Oliver Williamson in analyzing governance modes.  No 
regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation.  As such, 
none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function 
together.  Splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis.  By contrast, 
since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing 
each one.  In that view, the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 deals with the weak points 
of prudential regulation and discusses the progress that we can expect from the future Basel 3 
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agreements.  In Section 2, we underline the weak points of internal control and we try to 
show that the fault line does not reside in the linkage between internal control and supervision 
as such, but rather in the evolution of internal control during recent years.  Section 3 focuses 
on the weak points of market discipline, stressing problems and the way forward.  Section 4 
is the conclusion.
1. prudential regulation: the Weak points
Even though we learn from crises, and more particularly from financial crises, they come 
back again and again, as Paul Krugman explains in “The Return of Depression Economics” 
(1999) – but always from where we least expected them.  All throughout the 1980s, 
regulatory authorities tried to reach an agreement in the Basel Committee on how to make 
banks comply with a solvency standard.  The first Basel agreements in 1989 eventually 
managed to establish the Cooke ratio – capital/risk-weighted assets >8% – after long years 
of discussion.  Throughout the 1990s, prudential authorities continued to focus on solvency, 
initially broadening capital standards to market risks, then refining credit risk measurement 
and extending risk measurement to operational risk (the Basel 2 agreements, which entered 
into force only in 2007-2008).  In this way, the banking establishment’s solvency improved 
over these years.  Predictably however, the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 
did not stem from insolvency issues.
The faults in prudential regulation revealed by the financial crisis – which we propose to focus 
on here – involve three aspects:
 – inadequate attention to illiquidity risks,
 – too little asset leverage constraint,
 – credit procyclicality, compounded by accounting and prudential standards.
The illiquidity risk
From the 1980s on, regulators’ attention focused on the solvency of banks, which sought 
tools that would enable them to reduce the regulatory cost of capital, in order to “manage” 
regulatory constraint as well as possible.  This is the context where securitization and credit 
derivatives developed, allowing banks to reduce the denominator of the Cooke ratio to a 
minimum.  With the help of this circumvention, bank balance sheet solvency – as evidenced 
by regulatory ratios – improved from 1990 to 2000.  By contrast, during this same period, 
balance sheet liquidity as measured by the share of liquid assets steadily broke down. 
Charles Goodhart (2008) cites an article by Tim Congdon where he mentions the fact that 
British banks in the 1950s held a large percentage of liquid assets, around 30 percent of 
their balance sheet, in the form of treasury bonds or short-term public securities.  Fifty years 
after, they hold no more than 1 percent.  The deterioration in liquidity did not raise any 
concern, since asset liquidity has habitually become associated more with the dynamism of a 
given market than with the short maturity per se of the assets.  Yet it is the incapacity of certain 
financial institutions to be able to mobilize liquid assets that caused the difficulties.  Certain 
Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran / International Economics 123 (2010), p. 13-3016
assets supposedly “easy” to sell owing to the dynamism of their secondary market before the 
crisis simply saw their market literally devastated by the crisis.
Since then, liquidity has been an important “work site” for regulators, but it is nevertheless 
a difficult one.  International negotiations on the subject failed in the 1980s.  The crisis has 
unquestionably underscored the importance and urgency of regulation, but what still remains 
to accomplish is to reconcile widely varying national practices and impose a measure which 
will, however, be simple.  Several routes can be envisaged.  The transformation of maturity 
can be limited by forcing banks to match a percentage of the resources they collect with 
assets of the same maturity or impose a minimum ratio of liquid assets/total assets in the 
balance sheet.  There is a trade off between these two possible approaches, since limiting 
transformation reduces the requirement for liquid assets and, on the contrary, having more 
liquid assets allows less constraint on transformation.  What remains to be found is the 
optimum relationship between these two types of requirement.  It will also be necessary to 
achieve a harmonized definition of liquid assets.  To this end, will it be necessary to consider 
the maturity, the degree of standardization, the secondary market’s volume of activity for the 
relevant assets, or some other criterion? Liquidity remains a complex concept and this will 
inevitably pose a problem in agreeing on a harmonized definition internationally.
In the Consultative Document (2009) preparing the upcoming Basel agreements (Basel 3), 
the Basel Committee proposed two ratios: a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).  In both cases, the idea is to reinforce the capacity of banks to 
withstand shocks.  The first ratio would make banks hold a stock of high-quality liquid assets 
enabling them to “survive” their commitments for 30 days, while the second is a structural 
liquidity ratio valid over a longer timeframe that would force banks to hold more stable 
resources (one year):
LCR = Stock of high-quality assets/net cash outflows over a 30 day time period > 100%
NSFR = Available amount of stable funding/required amount of stable funding > 100%
The liquidity “work site” does not only raise problems of parameterizing tools and harmonizing 
definitions, it also involves banks’ very raison d’être more fundamentally.  Economic literature 
grants banks two main reasons for existing.  The first is related to the problems of informational 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers which may make a direct transaction, like issuing 
securities, impossible on the market.  The second concerns the liquidity service that banks 
are capable of providing to depositors, while also allowing borrowers long-term financing. 
This liquidity service provided by banks inevitably exposes them to the risk of illiquidity.  As 
shown by the reference model established by Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig (1983), 
banks would not provide depositors with this assurance of liquidity if they were seeking 
perfect congruence for their liabilities and assets.  In this case in fact, there would be no 
risk-sharing between depositors who have made short-term investments and those who have 
invested their money for the long haul.  In addition, banks’ contribution to long-term financing 
would be restricted to resources collected in the long term.  This means that the illiquidity 
risk is a component of banking activity.  It is banks’ weakness as well as their justification for 
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existing.  Consequently, if banks’ exposure to the risk of illiquidity is reduced, their capacity 
for transforming short-term resources collected from depositors into long-term financing for 
the economy is also reduced.  This is what makes the “work site” such a difficult one: the 
illiquidity risk needs to be reduced without totally undermining banks’ reason for being. 
By undermining banks’ raison d’être, it is their contribution to long-term financing that is 
jeopardized.
Additionally, there is an interesting fact that stands out in the recent financial crisis.  Save 
a few exceptions unworthy of note outside the case of the British bank Northern Rock, the 
illiquidity crunch did not come from a run on tellers’ windows, but from a paralysis affecting the 
interbank market.  The bailout plans implemented by governments and monetary authorities 
established a temporary public guarantee of interbank resources, among other measures. 
The question is now whether this public guarantee should not be permanently instituted so 
as to ensure the liquidity of the interbank market.  Defending this option would however 
require two difficulties to be solved.  The first one involves the moral hazard generated by 
any type of guarantee: banks could let down their guard toward their counterparties on the 
interbank market, thereby increasing the risk of systemic crisis.  The second difficulty involves 
the “pricing” of the guarantee: a free guarantee would maximize the effect of moral hazard. 
Putting a price on the guarantee would mean being able to calibrate a sort of insurance 
premium paid by banks depending on the risk they present.  The principle is similar to the one 
in force for guaranteeing deposits, which would have to be adapted here to guaranteeing 
interbank resources.
Lastly, the total paralysis of the interbank market in the autumn of 2008 can be largely 
explained by the pure and simple disappearance of structured product markets.  These 
products were backed by mortgage or non-mortgage bank securities (Mortgage Backed 
Securities, Asset Backed Securities), or by other negotiable financial instruments (Collateralized 
Debt Obligations).  All their investors were particularly fond of them before the subprime 
crisis, but they lost any and all value as soon as the default rate increased on subprime loans 
which were abundantly securitized and transformed into MBS.  In this way, the securitization 
process at the origin of these products increasingly downplayed bank liquidity to the benefit 
of the banks’ capacity to exchange or deposit non-standard assets in guarantee.  These 
assets were negotiated and therefore also priced on over-the-counter markets.  Here the issue 
at stake is the regulation of structured product markets.  As soon as these products have been 
released from the pillory and the structuring activity has resumed, it would be advisable to 
think about the degree of standardization they should be subjected to and the conditions that 
should be laid down to regulate their exchange.  One of the main initiatives, pointed out in 
the FMI’s Financial Stability Report of April 2010, aims to place over-the-counter derivatives 
under the control of centralized clearing houses.
Leverage ratio
Theoretically, a solvency ratio weighted by banks’ asset risks is more effective than a simple 
ceiling on asset leverage.  This is what a number of authors endeavoured to demonstrate in the 
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1980s and 1990s, with Koehn and Santomero 1980, Kim and Santomero 1988, Keeley 
and Furlong 1990, and Rochet 1992 discussing the regulation of capital in the context of the 
portfolio choice theory.  They showed that a minimum non-weighted capital ratio, capital/
assets – i.e.  the inverted equivalent of asset leverage, assets/capital – would lead banks 
to readjust their portfolios by selecting the most profitable, and therefore also necessarily the 
most risky, assets for a given capital regulatory cost.  These authors deduced that weighting 
the ratio was essential and that the weighting factor should reflect the systematic risk (β ) of 
the assets.  This work contributed to giving international standards on capital an important 
theoretical basis.  Once the Cooke ratio was established at the end of the 1980s, regulators 
constantly refined the solvency ratio until they eventually achieved the closest approximation 
of the recommendations made in the economic literature.
One simple point was however neglected in both the theory and the practice of regulators: 
a carefully weighted capital ratio is no hindrance to operating with a high asset leverage 
value, much higher than the inverse of the weighted ratio.  In other words, the increasing 
sophistication of the solvency standard did not keep certain banks from operating with an 
asset leverage, assets/capital, far higher than 12.5.2  Lastly, capital ratios have become 
asset allocation tools for banks rather than tools to reduce risk-taking, thereby weakening their 
role as warning signals.
The importance of leverage in the dynamic management of banks’ balance sheets was also 
neglected.  Now the adjustments brought about by seeking a target leverage value are a 
powerful factor in propagating crises by amplifying asset price variations.  As explained 
by Tobias Adrian and Hyun Son Shin (2009), banks target an asset leverage value (e.g. 
a fixed ratio of assets/capital), which in the event of a drop in securities prices on the 
market will prompt them to sell assets so as to re-establish their leverage at the target level. 
Symmetrically, in the event of an increase in asset prices, they will buy assets.  In both cases 
targeting a leverage value will amplify the variation in asset prices.  The fact that banks allow 
themselves to have a higher target leverage value in periods of growth and practice a lower 
one in economic slumps, or in other words the fact that the target is procyclic, compounds 
the problem even more.
Reducing the asset leverage value at a level that remains stable as has been the practice 
in Canada since the beginning of the 1980s might help limit the amplification effects on 
the variations in asset prices at the heart of crisis propagation.  The recent financial crisis 
will in any case have revealed the need not to believe in the solvency ratio alone, however 
sophisticated it may be.  As Jean-Charles Rochet and Matthias Dewatripont commented 
somewhat humorously during a conference devoted to The Future of Financial Regulation 
in January 2009: “It’s better to be approximately right than accurately wrong!” Adapted 
to the subject, it means that a menu of simple ratios composing a set of warning signals is 
2.  The inverse of the regulatory capital ratio corresponds to an asset leverage level that should not exceed 
1/8% = 12.5, with one sole difference, and it is a big one: in the regulatory ratio the assets are weighted 
according to their risk.  When asset leverage is calculated taking an asset value that is non-weighted by risk, the 
result was between 30 and 50, or sometimes even higher in the case of certain banks before the financial crisis.
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better than a single Basel 2-type ratio.  Even though this single ratio may very sophisticated, 
particularly when it is calculated on the basis of advanced internal ratings-based approach, 
it misses its objective which should be to limit risk-taking.
With a view to the upcoming Basel 3 agreements, a leverage ratio between assets on and off 
the balance sheet and hard capital was submitted by the Basel Committee for consultation. 
However, European banks tend to frown on this ratio because of the accounting distortions 
they suffer from in comparison with American banks which are authorized to practice clearing 
on derivatives and repos, thereby reducing the size of their balance sheets.
The procyclicality issue
There is an aspect of regulatory capital requirements that prudential authorities hardly attempted 
to correct at all before the crisis.  These constraints accentuate the credit procyclicality.  In 
times of sustained growth, prudential constraints are “toothless”, and this means that banks 
comply with them without any trouble.  It is a completely different story however when growth 
falls off and the situation on financial markets deteriorates.  Banks then have to deal with an 
increasing default rate and the context is not propitious to obtaining added capital.  In this 
case, regulatory capital requirements show their teeth and force banks to tighten credit even 
more than they would have without any constraints.  In the same way, accounting standards 
that impose market price valuation on banks are necessarily procyclical, since compliance 
with these rules inflates the value of assets when things are humming along and reduces it 
sometimes drastically when the economy is in the doldrums.
The lack of attention paid to this procyclic problem can be explained largely by the 
“microprudential” nature of the approach taken by the supervisory authorities before the 
crisis.  They concentrated on banks’ individual risks, considering that this was the best way to 
ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole.  This approach comes up against the 
fact that systemic risk is not a simple sum of individual risks.  Phenomena such as contagion, 
propagation and amplification come into play in the event of systemic crisis.  The financial 
crisis has shown the need for a more comprehensive approach to supervision that is termed 
macroprudential.  Bank of International Settlements economists have long defended the merits 
of a macroprudential approach to supervision and the need to coordinate it with monetary 
policy, as evidenced by Claudio Borio’s research (see for exemple Borio (2003), Borio and 
Ilhyock (2007), Borio (2010), and Annual reports of Bank for International Settlements). 
With a view to better preventing systemic crises, supervisory authorities will have to be 
more attentive to overall ups and downs from now on – particularly as regards credit and 
asset prices – in order to better detect incipient speculative bubbles.  This will require new 
indicators, new instruments and even new institutions (see Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy n°11).  As was recommended for Europe by the Larosière report, we can expect 
systemic risk committees to be developed within central banks, which will thereby be more 
involved in supervision.  The instruments implemented will for the most part be based on 
capital surcharge for systemic banks and on contracyclic measures.  The experience of 
Spain’s banking sector had never inspired much of a following before the crisis.  Yet, from 
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the beginning of the 1990s, Spain set up a forward looking provisioning system that made 
banks set up reserve funds to offset credit risks, based not on actual losses, but much farther 
upstream on the statistical estimate of loss risks.  So in times of strong growth when banks 
grant a lot of credit, they have to set aside large reserves to cover risks as a complement 
to the capital that they have to hold in proportion to their risky commitments.  This system of 
dynamic provisioning is likely to have shored up the resilience of Spain’s banking sector in a 
macroeconomic context that was hard hit by the economic crisis, with an unemployment rate 
to 15% in 2009, severe shrinkage in consumption and investment.
The Basel Committee has taken on the issue and will make an effort in its future recommendations 
to favour the adoption of forward looking provisioning during the credit cycle.  In the same 
perspective, the Basel Committee should recommend capital buffers to be set up by banks 
when the fundamentals are good so that they could be used when the economy deteriorates. 
Liquidity ratios, leverage ratios and capital buffers will be at the heart of the Basel  3 
agreements.  These measures will have to offset the past inadequacies of prudential rules. 
Even so, they do not contradict pre-crisis prudential regulation: more capital and more reserves 
to prevent risks, probably with a new adjustment to the business cycle.  This continuity may 
explain why Europeans are in favour of them.  Americans, who are more critical of the Basel 
approach, have launched more radical proposals, such as taxation of banking operations 
or separation of banking and securities industries.  In any case, the banking lobbies can be 
expected to wind up obtaining substantial flexibility.
2. internal control: the Weak points
Supervision and internal control: stronger together
Basel 2 endorsed a strong relationship between banking regulation and internal control.  In 
the 1990-2000 period, banks made progress in managing risks, e.g.  ALM, scoring, data 
mining, value at risk models, etc., and rapidly sought to show off their risk management 
proficiency on the international scene.  For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
major international bank JP Morgan widely disseminated its Risk Metrics model used to 
evaluate market risks.  Its lobbying campaign with the Basel Committee resulted in the 
Committee recognizing banks’ capacity to assess their own capital needs by complying with 
certain conditions that were both quantitative – e.g. history, completeness and robustness 
and of the data base used – and qualitative – e.g. organization of risk management.
From Basel 2 agreements, what was common practice only for determining the coverage of 
market risks by capital was extended to all of the risks: credit, market and operational risks. 
Since then banks have had the choice between the standard regulatory model and two 
internal approaches, one of which is termed the “advanced internal ratings-based approach” 
and allows banks to calculate their capital coverage with the use of their models.
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There are several reasons why internal control and supervision should work together, that 
this is not only advisable but even necessary.  First of all, linkage between them encourages 
a convergence of views between bank regulators and banks, and this convergence is 
indispensable to limit circumvention of regulations by banks.  When the standards handed 
down by regulators are too far removed from standards that banks would apply to themselves, 
they will do everything in their power to get around the rules, by hook or by crook, with 
new products and new financial techniques for example.  Securitization is a case in point 
here.  Securitization began to develop in the 1990s at the time of the Cooke ratio, when 
banks came under the obligation of a regulatory ratio for capital based on a measurement 
of risks (ratio weighting) that was alien to banks’ rationale.  In retrospect, the development 
of securitization can be interpreted as a technique to circumvent standards on capital.  By 
securitizing part of their assets, banks managed to reduce the denominator of the capital/
weighted assets ratio, thereby complying more readily with regulatory standards.
The greater the divergence of views and measurement modes between regulator and regulatee, 
the more regulation is condemned to a dialectic process of regulation –  deregulation  – 
re-regulation, due to the strategies deployed by banks.  Associating internal control and 
regulation entails greater convergence of views.  In this way, it can reduce the urge for banks 
to sidestep regulations, since to a certain extent they are more involved in determining the 
standards they have to comply with.  In addition, the genuinely closer relationship that this 
brings about between banks and regulators means greater information-sharing, which can 
allow regulators to keep abreast of the situation and adapt faster to developments in the 
banks’ activity model.  The regulators’ response time to changes that characterize banking 
activity is a factor accentuating financial instability and the reduction in delays that can be 
expected from better communication of information would therefore be favourable lowering 
financial instability.
Therefore, the fault line does not reside in the linkage between internal control and supervision 
as such, but rather in the evolution of internal control during recent years.
Externalisation of  risk management
Paradoxically, the management of banking risks, which is an important component of internal 
control, evolved in 1990-2000 by resorting increasingly to externalization techniques, i.e. 
the transfer of risks outside banks.  Securitization along with credit derivatives allowed 
banks to transfer their risks to others and this resulted in a radical change in the banking 
model.  Banks went from an originate to hold model, whereby they carried the risks that 
they originated, to an originate to distribute model, whereby they generated risks and then 
transferred them to other players who sold protection on the credit derivatives market or 
others who bought structured products such as ABS, MBS and CDO issued by securitization 
vehicles, or SPV.  Initially, the change in model was not perceived as encouraging instability; 
on the contrary this transfer was expected to give rise to better risk-sharing and thereby 
give the financial system more resilience.  The financial crisis proved just how wrong this 
misconception was.  The explanation resides in the fact that risk-sharing among a larger 
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number of bank and non-bank players brought about a dilution of risk control and follow-up. 
Additionally, the possibility to transfer risks was of course not neutral for risk-taking behaviour; 
banks took on more risks knowing that they could always transfer a large part of them.
Resorting to the externalization of banking risk management poses a double problem. 
First, unlike the process of externalization seen in other industries in 1990-2000, which 
generally involved the transfer of non-core activities, such as accounting and IT services, the 
externalization of services in the banking sector involved no less than the very heart of the 
sector’s activity.  The core of a bank’s activity usually resides in its capacity to generate assets 
and therefore risks that the market could not have produced.  Credit is asset specific to banks 
that they can generate due to their capacity to manage the phenomena of adverse selection 
and moral hazard that stem from informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. 
Now here is where the second part of the problem comes: when banks securitize credit or 
transfer their credit risks by buying a CDS on the credit derivatives market, the market winds 
up finding itself in the position of pricing what it was however incapable of originating. 
Starting with the principle that a large percentage of banking assets, credits in particular, get 
their value from the production of information by banks, these assets are finally emptied of 
their substance when they are transformed into market assets on the basis of the value that the 
market confers to them.  These securitized debts have no fundamental value other than the 
value that bankers can confer to them.  Their market value once securitized is based solely 
on their capacity to be exchanged.  Should these exchanges ever be broken off for whatever 
reason and these securitized debts will no longer have any value.  This is what happened 
on the market for MBS and ABS, structured products matched to mortgage or non-mortgage 
bank debts.
Mathematical models and the illusion of  control
A good proportion of risk management has been externalized via securitization and credit 
derivatives.  As for the “internalised” part, it is based on the use of mathematical financial 
models.  It was the development of these models that allowed banks to take an active role 
in the supervisory system.  Ample financial literature (see Kupiec (1995) in particular, or 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002)) pointed out the limits of value at risk models, which were 
used initially for the evaluation and coverage of market risks and then later in the same 
way for credit risks.  Despite their limits, the models have been increasingly successful with 
bankers, to the point of giving them a dangerous “illusion of control”.
These models have not only made bankers persist in the idea that they could control the risks 
associated with market activities, but they have also conferred a scientific basis to risk-taking. 
It has since become increasingly easier for the front office people, first and foremost those 
on the trading floor, to justify the complexity or even opacity of their operating strategies. 
However, when science is invoked, people are much readier to accept the fact that they 
do not understand.  Let us consider a few examples: Neek Leeson, who made the Barings 
Bank lose 1.35 billion dollars, causing it to go into receivership under the Bank of England 
in late February 1995, before it was bought by the Dutch group ING Bank; Jérôme Kerviel, 
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accused of fraud causing the Société Générale to lose nearly 5 billion euros in January 
2008; Bernard Madoff, whose crooked dealings were discovered in December 2008 and 
reportedly cost the investors who had entrusted him with their money no less that 50 billion 
dollars.  They all found a way to bypass internal and even external control: internal risk control 
departments in the case of Leeson and Kerviel, as well as external control by the SEC, the 
American control authority for the stock exchange and investment funds, which held hearings 
on several occasions for Bernard Madoff.  In addition, they achieved it all with disconcerting 
ease by systematically invoking a complex investment or coverage strategy based on a 
mathematical model.  Our purpose here is not to dismiss the use of risk assessment models 
in banks but rather to suggest that they have patently contributed to the front office taking on 
an unprecedented ascendancy over the back office.  As a result of “scientization”, risk-taking 
jobs have become the “diva” jobs in banks.  They demand the best qualified employees, 
the cream of the crop from the most reputed graduate schools and prestige engineering 
schools.  They also offer fixed remuneration and variable bonuses higher than those paid to 
the members of the board! At the same time, the control functions, or back office, have been 
relegated to the back burner, even though they justify banks’ reason for being.  Banks have 
moved away from the role of delegated monitor that banking theory was fond of presenting 
to define them.  Rethinking the business model of banks will require a reassessment of the 
risk-control management activity.
3. market discipline: the Weak points
The banking regulatory system set up in the 1930s in the United States and in the post-war 
years in Europe and Japan had completely removed market mechanisms from the regulation 
of the banking sector, considering that the 1929 crisis had proof positive of their inefficiency. 
Administered regulation of the banking sector worked as long as economies remained closed 
and the activity of financial markets remained at a low level.  The economic instability of 
the 1970s upset administered regulation however.  Owing to the surplus balance of trade 
obtained by oil producing countries subsequent to the oil-price shocks of 1973 and 1979, 
capital flows started circulating again intensively.  Meanwhile rising risks –  interest and 
exchange rates – linked to the inflationist context of the period and to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system seriously encouraged the development of new financial products 
and served as a trampoline for capital markets.  “Administered” banks then had to confront 
the competition from other domestic and foreign banks, as well as from booming financial 
markets favouring the boom of investment funds and other financial intermediaries.  From 
then on, banking regulation had to adapt to this new context.  Gradually, regulations that 
administered the banking sector, such as regulation of interest rates, control of credit, selected 
loans system, and exchange control, were suppressed in favour of new standards aiming to 
reduce risk-taking without keeping market mechanisms from participating in the regulation of 
the sector, i.e.  free determination of prices and volumes of credits, by confronting supply and 
demand, and free competition, among others.
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Market discipline levers
Re-establishing market mechanisms reintegrated what is termed  “market discipline” in the 
overall regulation of the sector.  Market discipline includes all of the pressures that providers 
of funds can exert on banks’ management.  Several levers contribute to market discipline:
 – The first resides in the informational content of market prices used as a basis for investors 
to decide to invest in banking securities.  Market prices, and more particularly a bank’s 
share prices or its bonds rates, supposedly supply information about the issuing bank’s 
state of health.
 – Communication of information by banks to their depositor and investor clients as well as 
to the regulator is yet another lever of market discipline to the extent that this information 
allows investors to better substantiate their financial decisions.
 – Transparency of accounts is also an important condition for investors to be have clear 
views on whether to buy or sell the securities issued by banks, in other words to determine 
the amount and price of the resources they plan to deposit in or withdraw from a bank.
In the context of present-day supervision, market discipline has mainly been implemented 
based on three factors:
 – Communication of information, which regulators have attempted to intensify.  The third pillar 
of the Basel 2 agreements basically involves the requirement of financial communication. 
Two types of requirement can be distinguished: communication of information from banks 
to the regulator, or reporting, and communication that banks are held to provide to their 
clients, or disclosure.
 – Ratings, which have begun to play a leading role in supervision.  This information is 
extremely well monitored by investors and was included in supervision set-up via Basel 2. 
The standard method of determining the capital needed for credit risk coverage involves 
the use of external rating by rating agencies.
 – Accounting standards in market value, as defined by the IASB, International Accounting 
Standards Board, in force since 2005.  They aim to provide investors more transparent 
information on the balance sheets and results of the companies quoted.  The IAS 39 
standard applicable to banks makes them value a maximum number of items in their 
balance sheet and off of it at a fair value, the value dictated by the market, or to calculate 
a theoretical market value derived from a mathematical assessment model when this fair 
value does not exist.
Problems and the way forward
Here again, the problem does not reside in the fact of interlinking market discipline and 
regulation.  If we accept the principle that no regulation mechanism is omniscient, then the 
association between them would even appear to be indispensable.  Yet, the present-day 
levers of market discipline still did not help prevent the financial crisis, any more than 
prudential regulation or internal control.  This leads us to wonder about the effectiveness of 
each of the levers used.
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Regarding the communication of information, which information should be transmitted, to 
whom and how often? If there is little risk that banks’ reporting to supervisory authorities 
might have negative effects on financial stability – except maybe for the opportunity cost 
of the time devoted to reporting – the same can not be said of the disclosure requirements. 
Communicating too often to clients and investors may – and this is a well-known fact – set 
off an over-reaction in their midst and instead of correcting and stabilizing any difficulties 
disclosed, it could on the contrary reinforce them.  Announcing poor results could for example 
cause a rush to sell a bank’s securities.  In this regard, reporting is seemingly easier to handle 
than disclosures.
This being true, the question that remains is what kind of information the regulator should 
require in order to ward off crises effectively.  From this standpoint, the recent crisis has 
revealed the usefulness of “stress tests” which assess the impact of macroeconomic stress 
scenarios on the key variables and results of banking activity.  In this way, the impact of 
a slowdown in economic growth, an increase in interest rates or a severe variability in 
exchange rates, can be assessed in terms of solvency, liquidity or profitability.
For quite some time, the nature of the information required belonged to a microprudential 
system and finally proved to be redundant when compared with the information destined to 
check conformity with prudential standards.  During the crisis, stress tests were used mainly 
to designate which financial institutions should be recapitalized.  Regular communication 
of stress tests helped monitor the resilience of institutions taken both individually and as a 
whole in dealing with the vagaries of the macroeconomic environment.  In other words, 
the communication of the information required by the regulator could be a better warning 
signal within the context of a macroprudential system.  This system consists in assessing and 
monitoring the systemic risk that the institutions could be exposed to, not only due to the 
contagion of individual difficulties but also owing to common exposure to macroeconomic 
shocks.
As was the case in previous crises, rating agencies were criticized – not without reason – for 
having been unable to warn investors of the upcoming crisis, although they were producing 
the information that was undoubtedly most closely followed by the market.  Several factors 
explain this.  First of all, rating methods have plainly not yet been adapted well enough to 
the sophistication of structured products and therefore transmitted biased information about 
product quality.  Meanwhile, structured products are at the heart of the crisis.  Insufficient 
development of rating methods is not unrelated to the high concentration of the rating market. 
There are three major agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch which divide up 
90% of the market, with the remaining 10% shared out among some 150 other very small 
agencies, so there is very little emulation and innovation among agencies.  Additionally, 
rating agencies took part in structuring the products that they also rated, and received large 
commissions for their consulting and structuring services.  This caused a conflict of interest 
likely to bode ill for impartial ratings.  
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Until the recent crisis, even though rating agencies had become major players in the market 
discipline and supervision system, they were not closely monitored.  In December 2004, the 
OICV laid down the main principles of good conduct, insisting on the quality and integrity 
of the rating procedure, the independence of agencies, the need to avoid conflicts of interest 
and the responsibilities of agencies toward issuers as well as investors.  If the principles 
of the code are apparently moving in the right direction, it must be admitted that the code 
did not have much impact on the agencies’ behaviour.  A code of good conduct does not 
have the constraining nature of a regulation.  Subsequent to the crisis meeting of the G20 
in London, the member states of the European Union endorsed the principle of mandatory 
registration for agencies, forcing them to comply with rules of transparency and dissemination 
of information.  We have not yet reached the stage of rules dictated on an international scale 
however.  There is also a tricky problem to solve: it will be necessary to reconcile a stricter 
framework – the equivalent of entrance barriers to the ratings market – and the entrance of 
new agencies to dilute the concentration of the ratings market.
Lastly, the laudable intentions presiding over the implementation of accounting standards 
underestimated several detrimental effects.  First of all, the standards aim to place a market 
value on assets which do not necessarily have one, even more so when the assets involved 
are for example credits originated by banks.  The securitization of bank assets maintained 
the illusion that bank assets were finally not different from a portfolio of negotiable assets that 
could be associated with a market value.  However, during the crisis the products matched 
to bank debts suddenly became illiquid, in other words, impossible to trade.  This episode 
demonstrated that the application of market value accounting was heavily dependent on the 
liquidity of assets.  Secondly, during the crisis, market value accounting amply precipitated 
the sale of assets and contributed to the contagion and amplification of the crisis.  This 
amplification process corresponds to what we discussed earlier on the subject of target 
leverage: market value accounting forces banks to realize immediately when their asset value 
varies and to adapt to the situation.  When they realize that the value of their assets has 
fallen, with the resulting drop in the value of their capital – assuming that the value of debt 
does not vary – banks must react to an increase in asset leverage.  This is what they do when 
they sell assets, and this reinforces the drop in asset value and so on and so forth.  More 
broadly, it is the procyclic effect of these accounting standards which is in question, since 
they tend to inflate banks’ asset purchases and good results in the good times and precipitate 
asset sales and lower results when the going gets rough.
During the crisis, a rearrangement of accounting standards proved to be necessary. 
Announced as a temporary measure initially, it will finally be imposed definitively.  Regarding 
the principle, the idea is to authorize an accounting measure that is an alternative to “fair 
value”, when the market no longer provides normal asset liquidity conditions.  However, 
an important point was emphasized by Didier Marteau and Pascal Morand in their report 
(2010): the choice must not be left to the discretion of the players, but should come from a 
relevant public authority.  In short, the idea is not to break the thermometer that constitutes 
market value accounting, but to know when to use it and to have another measure on 
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standby when the market is no longer in a position to provide the realistic price, submitting 
the decision to a public authority.
4. conclusion
Above and beyond attempting to show that we do not advocate breaking up the big three, 
but rather reinforcing them in each of their axes, i.e.  prudential regulation, internal control 
and market discipline, the question arises of the institutions that financial regulation functions 
around.  Despite the crisis and the reforms that it helped launch, there has not been much 
institutional evolution on an international scale.  Most supervisory structure reforms have been 
strictly national (see the Deletré Report and the Report of the Group of 30).  France and 
Belgium have for example begun reforms of their supervisory systems which date back to 
before the crisis.  These two countries are planning to move toward a twin-peaks organization:
supervision of financial go-betweens, such as banks, insurance, securities managers, under 
the control of a single authority, with monitoring of markets and of the conduct of business 
under that of a second authority.  In this regard, the crisis seems to have highlighted the need 
not to mix up prudential supervision and conduct of business, but to make the protection of 
financial services consumers a fully-fledged objective in itself.  The crisis has also shown the 
need for a close relationship between the central bank and financial supervisors.  Integrated 
systems, with a single supervisor, had not taken this constraint into much account, in particular, 
the British model, which was the object of much criticism.  In Great Britain and Germany, 
the central bank should see its role developing in prudential supervision.  The issue is more 
heavily debated in the United States, since the increased influence of the Fed in supervision 
raises fears of too highly concentrated power.
Therefore the crisis caused or accelerated the reforms in the structure of the supervisory system 
but on a national level; internationally evolution is necessarily slower.  Certainly, the IMF saw 
its role in financial stability reaffirmed and the Financial Stability Forum was rebaptized the 
“Financial Stability Council”.  Still however, a host of national supervisory authorities will 
have to continue to coordinate their action as well as they can, attending the meetings of 
international and European consultancy committees.  As of yet, there has been no global 
financial regulation in a global world of finance, but a step has perhaps been taken in 
Europe thanks to the recommendations made in the report of the group presided over by 
Jacques de Larosière.  The three European national regulators’ coordination committees for 
the banking sector (CESB), the insurance sector (CEIOPS) and the securities market sector 
(CESR), that were set up in the context of the Lamfalussy procedure will be granted their own 
powers, which may eventually turn them into genuine European regulation authorities.
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